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THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: COST-BENEfiT 
ANALYSIS, EMISSIONS TRADING, AND 
PRIORITY-SETTING 
DAVID M. DRIESEN* 
Abstract: An economic dynamic approach to environmental law offers a 
more promising avenue for regulatory reform that the current static-
efficiency-based approach. An economic dynamic approach seeks to 
emulate the creativity and innovation that free markets sometimes 
produce, instead of the efficiency that the economists ascribe to it for 
purposes of economic modeling. Environmental law must cope with a 
predictable set of economic dynamics. Population and consumption 
increases tend to increase pollution and natural resource destruction over 
time while empowering dirty old industries. We need a reform agenda 
focused on regulatory design that encourages innovations adequate to 
cope with significant environmental change over time. Such an agenda 
would emphasize changes in regulatory process to reduce the influence 
of existing dirty industries, regulatory designs that encourage innovation, 
and creative efforts to circumvent problems with languid and sometimes 
ineffectual governmental decisionmaking processes. 
INTRODUCTION 
This symposium issue includes articles from contributors to the 
conference on Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law and the 
Static Efficiency, held at Syracuse University College of Law in Octo-
ber of 2003. The conference, and hence this symposium issue, con-
trasts major points of view regarding directions for reform. One view. 
involves an emphasis on reforms having their origins in ideals of eco-
nomic efficiency. A contrasting view emphasizes changes over time, 
* Professor, Syracuse University College of Law; J.D. Yale Law School, 1989. I would 
like to thank Dean Hannah Arterian for suggesting the conference at Syracuse University 
College of Law that generated the papers for this symposium issue, Zygmunt Plater for 
arranging publication with the Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, Chris 
Ramsdell and Theresa Coulter for their work in organizing the conference, and all of the 
participants in the conference for a lively exchange of ideas. Portions of this Essay are 
based on THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, a book written by the author 
and published in 2003. 
501 
502 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 31:501 
uncertainty and pressure on regulatory agencies to do little or noth-
ing. I have developed this second point of view in a recently published 
book, The Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law} This article will 
explain this theory and use it to address three topics: cost-benefit 
analysis, emissions trading, and priority-setting. It will also show how 
an economic dynamic theory suggests a fresh agenda for regulatory 
reform-an agenda addressing the key questions that the theory 
raises about how to allow environmental law to adequately cope with 
change over time. 
Part I explains the standard efficiency-based view and how it has 
led to widespread support for cost-benefit analysis and emissions trad-
ing. Part II offers a general economic dynamic critique of these rec-
ommendations. Part III proposes some alternatives. 
I. THE EFFICIENCy-BASED REFORM AGENDA 
Many economists and policy experts view environmental policy 
through a neoclassical economic efficiency lens. This lens has led to 
criticism of environmental law as based on poor priority-setting and to 
increased reliance upon cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in determining the 
goals of environmental regulation and environmental benefit trading 
as the principle means of obtaining those goals.2 
A Priority-Setting 
Regulated corporations, the think tanks they finance, and some 
academics have criticized regulatory programs as reflecting poor pri-
ority-setting. In making this criticism, they rely upon tables purporting 
to show the dollars of regulatory expenditures per life saved under 
various rule making initiatives.3 These tables suggest that the dollars 
expended per life saved vary quite widely from regulation to regula-
tion. Lisa Heinzerling has shown that these tables present very mis-
leading data.4 While regulatory reformers have treated them as com-
1 DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAw (2003). 
2 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION (1993) (claiming that environmental law suffers from poor priority-setting); 
Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REv. 7, 39-40 nn.155-58 (1998) 
(citing other regulatory reformers' priority-setting arguments); Richard H. Pildes & Cass 
R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1,86-89 (1995) (advocating 
cost-benefit analysis to cure poor priority-setting). 
5 Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE LJ. 1981, 1983, 1993-
98 (1998) (describing the influence of tables denoting dollars per lives saved). 
4 [d. at 1998-2042. 
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pendiums of agency cost estimates for real regulations, many of the 
regulations listed were never enacted.5 Furthermore, the cost esti-
mates for enacted regulations come from the authors of the tables, 
not from the administrative agencies that developed the regulations. 
But a more fundamental puzzle involves the question of why anybody 
would think that uneven dollars per lives saved indicates poor priority-
setting.6 If we gave high priority to the most serious hazards and low 
priority to less serious hazards, the cost of remedial measures might 
still be very uneven. Some hazards just cost more to remedy than oth-
ers. It is not obvious that dollars per life saved should be approxi-
mately equal across regulation.7 
The reliance on these tables as evidence of poor priority-setting 
assumes that regulations should generate approximately even dollar ex-
penditures per life saved. But a moment's reflection suggests that this 
idea is deeply problematic. Many environmental regulations aim to ad-
dress widespread illness and ecological damage as well as, or rather 
than, death.8 Regulatory reformers, however, do not explicitly argue 
that priority-setting should ignore illness and ecological damage, as their 
approach does.9 
While regulatory reformers never explain why they think this sort 
of data provides significant information about priority-setting, the eco-
nomic efficiency ideal can help explain why this belief appears sensible 
to some people.1O For, as we shall see, the economic efficiency ideal as-
sumes that the costs of each government regulation should approxi-
mately equal the dollar value economists associate with the benefits 
each regulation generates. If one accepts this assumption, it may seem 
natural to assume that unevenness of expenditures involves some de-
fect in priority-setting. 
5 [d. at 1984. 
6 See David M. Driesen, Getting Our Priorities Straight: One Strand of the Regulatory Reform 
Debate, [2001] 31 Envtl. L. Rep, (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,003,10,017 (jan., 2001). 
7 [d. at 10,017-18, 
8 See generally Lisa Heinzerling, Political Science, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 449 (1995) (book re-
view). 
9 Cf id, at 470 (discussing Justice Breyer's implicit view that the proper goal of risk 
regulation is to save human lives). 
10 For a more extended treatment of how economic efficiency might help explain 
regulatory reformers' priority-setting arguments, and an extended critique of this ap-
proach, see Driesen, supra note 6. 
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B. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Economists like CBA of environmental regulation, because they 
believe that it helps make regulation better conform to neoclassical 
ideals of allocative efficiency. A project is allocatively efficient if its 
benefits match its costs.ll This efficiency idea comes from a model of 
free markets that assumes that buyers only pay as much for a good as 
it is worth to the purchaser.12 Economists implicidy analyze regulation 
preventing harms as the purchase of a good, and assume that the 
regulator should pay no more than the good (environmental quality) 
is worth to the public consumers of clean air, water, and land. They 
treat the environment like a commodity, rather than as a system of life 
upon which we depend.13 
While most of the environmental statutes aim to protect public 
health and the environment, policy-makers have increased reliance 
upon CBA in recent years. Presidents Reagan, Bush, Sr., and Clinton 
promulgated executive orders calling for more CBA, and Congress 
ratified these orders in 1995.14 Thus, CBA has become influential in 
establishing the goals of environmental regulation. 
CBA depends upon quantifying the harms regulations avoid-the 
benefits of avoided death, illness, and ecological destruction-in dollar 
terms and projecting future costs.15 Science rarely permits reasonably 
precise estimates of the amount of health or environmental damage a 
particular regulation will avoid.I6 In order to facilitate comparison of 
avoided harm with costs, economists ascribe dollar values to conse-
11 See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL &: WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POL-
ICY 23 (1975) (misallocation of resources can be fixed by charging price, or tax, equal to 
the social cost). 
12 See David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond Administra-
tive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 545, 578-79 (1997). 
15 See, e.g., JACK MANNO, COMMODITIZATION AND ITS IMPACT ON ENVIRONMENT AND 
SOCIETY 223 (2000) (questioning the treatment of environmental quality as a commodity); 
MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF TIlE EARTII 1100 (1988) (arguing that environmental 
protection should be based on debates about values, not summation of individual "prefer-
ences"). 
14 See Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, § 202, 109 Stat. 48 
(codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1532 (1995». 
15 See DRIESEN, supra note 1, at 21-23. 
16 See McGarity, supra note 2, at 13 (discussing problem of data gaps rendering risk as-
sessments, the basis for benefits estimates, incomplete and uncertain); see, e.g., Thomas O. 
McGarity, Politics by Other Means: Law, Science, and Policy in EPA's Implementation of the Food 
QJlality Protection Act, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 103, 120-92 (2001) (describing in detail the data 
gaps and judgments needed to assess risk under the Food Quality Protection Act). 
2004] Economic Dynamics: Cost-Benefit Analysis, Trading, and Priorities 505 
quences like death and illnessY The valuation methodology involves 
numerous controversial value assumptions. IS 
Rather than leading to a series of finely balanced decisions, CBA 
has tended to prevent administrative agencies from making any deci-
sions. It has thoroughly paralyzed efforts to impose regulatory restric-
tions under the Toxic Substances Control Act and of the Federal Insec-
ticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, the two federal environmental 
statutes that rely upon it most heavily.19 A major problem involved the 
government's inability to quantifY even well-understood dangers. A 
court, for example, rejected an Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) ban on asbestos, in part because EPA put too much emphasis on 
then unquantifiable health damage from asbestosis. 20 We now know 
that asbestos caused so much damage that compensation of victims 
bankrupted the asbestos industry.21 Calculation of the value of harms a 
regulation could avoid tends to paralyze agencies, because substan tial 
uncertainties always bedevil such accounting, even when the harms are 
obvious and very serious.22 
The Syracuse University College of Law conference generated some 
interesting discussion about the notion that CBA aids priority-setting. 
Advocates of this poin t of view have never explained precisely how it 
does that. Priority-setting usually refers to decisions about which things 
to regulate (agenda-setting), and in which order to regulate (ordering). 
The argument that CBA aids priority-setting suggests that movement 
toward a "cost-benefit state" merely involves decisions about ordering.23 
In fact, CBA usually addresses stringency, not priority-setting.24 
17 See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Pricel£ss: Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1553 (2002) (describing CBA as reducing 
benefits into dollars and cents to the extent possible). 
18 See generally FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING TIlE 
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND TIlE VALUE OF NOTIlING (2004) (describing many of the value 
assumptions employed in converting environmental and health benefits into dollars). 
19 See Driesen, supra note 12, at 601-05; Donald Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide 
Regulation on the Paradigms and Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 
422 (1993) (describing an "analytical treadmill" making progress on pesticide regulation 
"stren 1I01lS if not impossible"). 
20 Corrosion Proof Fittings v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 947 F.2d 1201, 1219 (5th Cir. 1991). 
For a critique of this decision, see Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of 
Rul£making: A Response to Professor Seidenfel, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 541-49 (1997). 
21 See Driesen, supra note 12, at 596. 
22 See id. at 594 (noting that EPA lacks information on health effects of the majority of 
toxic chemicals to which Americans are exposed). 
23 See Driesen, supra note 6, at 10,004. 
24 [d. 
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Some advocates of CBA probably view it as an appropriate aid to 
ordering.25 Advocates of CBA may imagine that government should 
schedule regulation to give priority to standards offering the most 
benefit per dollar.26 This idea raises serious questions in theory and is 
utterly impracticable. The regulation offering the best cost-benefit ratio 
might not be the regulation addressing the most serious health haz-
ard.27 Thus, this CBA ordering principal might allow more people to 
die-during the time interval before the lower priority regulations are 
imposed-than a worst-things-first principle. 
Pragmatically, implementation of this approach would require 
agencies to establish the costs and benefits of rules at the stage when 
they order their activities, rather than when they write standards. But 
the costs and benefits of rules hinge upon stringency decisions and 
require huge amounts of information. Agencies cannot possibly de-
cide upon the stringency of each regulation in advance for a variety of 
reasons. If an agency had enough people to make all these decisions 
at once, then it would not need to engage in any priority-setting. Pri-
ority-setting is needed precisely because it is so difficult to assess the 
costs and benefits of regulation.28 
Indeed, even if it were possible to gather information on every 
regulation at once, that information would be stale by the time the 
agency actually regulated. Often the cost of environmental technology 
comes down over time, and knowledge about health impacts changes 
with further study.29 Thus, the notion that CBA aids priority-setting 
involves a failure to understand very basic things about regulation, 
and even the reasons why some priority-setting is needed. 
C. Environmental Benefit Trading 
Economists and like-minded lawyers have also recommended en-
vironmental benefit trading programs as a means of enhancing the 
cost-effectiveness of environmental programs, another type of 
25 See id. at 10,018. While this has rarely been explicit in regulatory reformers' writing, 
it has been implicit. During the Economic Dynamics conference, at least one participant 
explicitly defended the idea that CBA aids ordering. 
26 A participant in this conference explicitly advocated this idea. 
27 See Driesen, supra note 6, at 10,018-19 (discussing these and other possible priority-
setting principles) . 
28Cf id. at 10,018 (discussing the problem of CBA-based priority-setting exercises con-
suming resources that could be devoted to protecting public health). 
29 See e.g., David M. Driesen, Mamets Are Not Magic, 20 ENV'IL. F. 19,24 (2003) (discuss-
ing example of renewable energy's falling cost). 
2004] Economic Dynamics: Cost-Benefit Analysis, Trading, and Priorities 507 
efficiency.3o These programs allow polluters to forego required envi-
ronmental improvements if they pay somebody else to make equiva-
lent improvements in their stead.31 This allows polluters to redistrib-
ute their pollution control obligations to achieve required reductions 
at the lowest possible cost. These programs have come to dominate 
United States policy.32 
Thus, benefit trading programs involve the use of efficiency, in the 
sense of cost-effectiveness, to guide choices about the means of envi-
ronmental protection. While some of these programs have proven suc-
cessful, the popularity of "market mechanisms" enhancing regulatory 
"efficiency" has led to overuse of the technique and design failures. 33 
When states have applied these programs to unmonitored pollutants, 
for example, they have often failed miserably in achieving environ-
men tal goals.34 
II. AN ECONOMIC DYNAMIC ALTERNATIVE 
Economic dynamic analysis calls into question the notion that 
static efficiency is important enough to merit the obsessive attention it 
has received. Mter all, technical progress, a response to economic dy-
namics, has provided a large contribution to the growth of industrial 
economies relative to that provided by increased inputs of capital and 
30 See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The De-
mocratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. j. ENVTI... L. 171 (1988); Robert W. Hahn & 
Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea1, 18 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991). 
31 See Driesen, supra note 29, at 21. 
32 See David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program 1: Replacing the 
Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289, 291-92 
(1998); see, e.g., Royal C. Gardner, Banking on Entrepreneurs: Wetlands, Mitigation Banking, 
and Takings, 81 IOWA L. REv. 527 (1996) (reviewing an intertemporal trading program for 
wetlands conservation); Ann Powers, Reducing Nitrogen Pollution on Long Island Sound: Is 
There a Place for Pollutant Trading1, 23 COLUM.j. ENVTI... L. 137 (1998) (discussing proposal 
to use nitrogen trading regionally to control water pollution). 
33 See, e.g., Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; New Jer-
sey; Open Market Emissions Trading Program, 67 Fed. Reg. 64,347 (Oct. 18, 2002) (an-
nouncing EPA decision not to proceed with processing New Jersey State Implementation 
Plan revisions, because New Jersey had found such serious problems in its emissions trad-
ing program that it was planning to abandon it); Richard Toshiyuki Drury et aI., Pollution 
Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles' Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE 
ENVTI... L. & POL'y F. 231, 258-63 (1999) (discussing fraud in the estimation of credits that 
undermines environmental performance). 
34 See, e.g., Drury, supra note 33, at 258-63 (discussing problems with trading volatile 
organic compounds). 
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labor.35 This means that frequently inefficient creativity and experi-
mentation playa major role in creating wealth.36 
Indeed, even that part of economic growth that comes from in-
creased inputs of capital and labor responds in part to economic dy-
namics. And analysis of the desirable amounts of these inputs in eco-
nomic theory involves questions of macroeconomic intertemporal 
efficiency, rather than only static microeconomic allocative efficiency. 
Economists define allocative efficiency in terms of matching sup-
ply and demand for a given technological state, an aspect of microeco-
nomic theory. I refer to efficiency concepts that assume an unchanging 
technological state as "static efficiency" concepts. Economists generally 
address determinants of rates of innovation and economic growth as a 
macroeconomic topic separate from static efficiency concerns. Indeed, 
the proposition that perfect static allocative efficiency contributes more 
to economic growth than a less efficient allocation is controversial in 
the economics profession. A debate has raged between economists 
about whether perfect competition is good for economic growth, even 
though all concede that perfect competition is necessary for optimum 
static allocation of goods and services.37 Perfect competition (a pre-
condition for static efficiency) benefits consumers by lowering prices to 
the point that profits diminish. But lower profit levels may make in-
vestment in technological innovation difficult, thus retarding economic 
growth.38 
Equilibriums come and go as the economy grows and changes 
over time.39 Temporary static equilibriums may simply not matter very 
much in the long run.40 
If the economy changes drastically, growing in scale, then the rela-
tionship of this growth to the earth's carrying capacity-the issue of 
!5 MICHAEL COMMON, SUSTAINABILITY AND POLICY: LIMITS TO ECONOMICS 139 (1995); 
NATIONAL SCIENCE AND ThCHNOLOGY COUNCIL, ThCHNOLOGY FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE 2 
(1994); Michael Barrows &Jay Stowsky, Technology Policy and Economic Growth, in INVESTING IN 
INNOVATION: CREATING A RESEARCH AND INNOVATION POLICY THAT WORKS 41 (Lewis M. 
Branscomb &James H. Keller eds., 1998). 
!6 ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAw AND MARKET ECONOMY: REINTERPRETING THE VALUES OF 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 78-99, 137 (2000). 
!7 SeeJOHN BATES CLARK, ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMIC THEORY 374 (1907); JOHN KEN-
NETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWERS 14-
18 (1952); IV J.S. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, ch. VII, § 7 (3d ed., Parker & 
Son 1852) (1848); JOSEPH A. SCHUM PETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 78 
(2d ed. 1947). 
i!8 EDWIN MANSFIELD, THE ECONOMICS OF TECHNICAL CHANGE 104-06 (1968). 
39 DRIESEN, supra note 1, at 4. 
40 Id. at 5. 
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scale-becomes more important than efficiency, even if one accepts a 
wealth creation goal.41 Efficiency, after all, simply allocates fixed re-
sources. It neither augments resources, as economic development does, 
nor diminishes available resources, as natural resource depletion does. 
The kind of static efficiency that economists use to model markets 
has little relation to very important free market virtues one might wish 
to emulate. Surely, many people admire the free market's tendency to 
reward innovation and change that betters people's material lives. Eco-
nomic growth, in part a byproduct of technological change, has long 
been the most sought after public benefit from a free market.42 
The importance of technological change in delivering desirable 
public benefits from the free market suggests that we should pay seri-
ous attention to change over time. Making technological change cen-
tral introduces a temporal dimension to the study of environmental 
policy. The direction of change over time becomes important and ques-
tions about cost must include thinking about cost over a long period of 
time. 
One might well want public law to stimulate innovation to better 
meet public goals. But innovation and growth frequently require ex-
perimentation. And experimentation often implies failure and 
inefficiency.43 In short, some tension exists between sound economic 
dynamics and perfect static efficiency.44 
A brief description of economic dynamics should prove helpful. 
Most fundamentally, economic dynamics focuses upon change over 
time. 
The idea of an economic dynamic analysis of law follows from 
some of the insights of institutional economists. In particular, institu-
tional economics and organizational theory assume that institutions, 
such as government agencies and corporations, make decisions using 
a form of "bounded rationality."45 Institutions' purposes and habits 
combine with a lack of comprehensive information to constrain the 
41 See HERMAN E. DALY, BEYOND GROWTII: THE ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVEL-
OPMENT 221 (1996); Douglas A Kysar, Sustainability, Distrilmtion, and the Macroeconomic 
Analysis of Law, 43 B.C. L. REv. 1 (2001). 
42 See DYNAMICS, ECONOMIC GROWTII, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 31 (Bjarne S. Jen-
sen & Kar-yiu Wong eds., 1997). 
43 See MALLOY, supra note 36, at 85. 
« DOUGLASS C. NORTII, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE 81 (1990). 
45 Oliver E. Williamson, Chester Barnard and the Incipient Science of Organization, in OR-
GANIZATION THEORY: FROM CHESTER BARNARD TO TIlE PRESENT AND BEYOND 172, 178-79 
(Oliver E. Williamson ed., 1995). 
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choices that they make. Their business and habits may make them 
more aware of some kinds of information and not others, and more 
prone to some kinds of actions and not others. 
Furthermore, decisionmaking by institutions is "path depend-
ent." Past actions and decisions tend to constrain the range of attrac-
tive future decisions. Thus, for example, a corporation that owns a 
coal-fired power plant facing a decision about how to produce more 
electricity will likely focus upon options that involve running its exist-
ing plant in different ways-for example, decisions that continue 
along a past path. A new business deciding about how to sell electric-
ity today may find building a new natural gas power plant attractive, 
for the lack of any prior commitments may make this the cheapest 
current option for that business.46 
Douglass North has used these ideas of path dependence and 
bounded rationality to study institutional change over time. Of par-
ticular relevance to the economic dynamics of law, he focuses upon an 
idea of "adaptive efficiency," an aid to understanding the rules that 
shape economic evolution over time.47 Adaptive efficiency concerns 
itself with the ability of a society to acquire knowledge, to experiment, 
and to creatively solve problems.48 Under conditions of uncertainty, 
North claims, nobody knows the correct answer to the problems they 
confront, and therefore nobody knows precisely how to maximize 
profits.49 Adaptive efficiency maximizes not present value, but future 
choice under conditions of uncertainty. It induces experiments with 
new methods and provides feedback mechanisms to allow for post-hoc 
correction of errors.50 
An economic dynamic analysis of environmental law moves be-
yond merely noticing what incentives a particular law provides. It would 
ask how the incentive provided actually influences the people the in-
centive might influence, using the concept of bounded rationality as a 
tool. This includes noticing whether the law provides an incentive that 
falls within the matters an institution or individual will actually pay at-
tention to, given the reality of bounded rationality. For example, the 
"tax on marriage" may provide an incentive not to marry, but the in-
46 ENVTL. LAw INST., CLEANER POWER: THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF MOVING FROM COAL 
GENERATION TI) MODERN POWER TECHNOLOGIES 4-5 (2001), http://www.elistore.org/re 
ports_detail.asp?ID=519 (last visited Mar. 5,2004). 
47 See NORTH, supra note 44, at 80. 
48 [d. 
49 [d. at 81. 
50 [d. at 99. 
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centive may not influence single persons' decisions about whether to 
marry because this factor lies outside the range of factors they will con-
sider in making this particular choice. This implies a need for more 
detailed study of institutions and individual behavior. 
In addition to noticing when bounded rationality makes an incen-
tive ineffective, economic dynamic analysis of law would notice and ac-
count for non-legal incentives. Thus, even if strict standards for new 
pollution sources provide an incentive not to build new plants-as 
many scholars have argued-attributing a failure to modernize power 
plants to this incentive without observing other market factors that 
might influence modification decisions provides an incomplete analy-
sis. Power plants must modernize because often old equipment wears 
out and only new equipment of different design is available to replace 
it. 51 Failing to modernize under that circumstance might make it im-
possible to generate power, and therefore, revenue. This incentive 
clearly would overcome any countervailing regulatory incentive. Mar-
ket incentives may often prove more influential than the legal ones, 
overriding them in some cases, or rendering them redundant in others. 
In other words, economic dynamic analysis should include careful ac-
counting for what is inside and outside the bounds of "bounded ration-
ality, " so that it takes notice of how law shapes, or fails to shape, society. 
An economic dynamic analysis would also build on public choice 
analysis to better understand possible future directions for law. 52 Pub-
lic choice analysis predicts that powerful interests have a dispropor-
tionate influence upon political decisions and thus upon the content 
of the law. Noticing whom the free market empowers and what sorts 
of legal rules these interests will want to pursue aids analysis of the 
future direction of legal rules. 
This economic dynamic analysis also provides tools to understand 
what problems free markets will create over time. Private firms and in-
dividuals will generally consider the costs and benefits to themselves, 
not efficiency in the abstract, in deciding which innovations to pursue. 
Recognizing these bounds upon rationality provides a useful tool in 
51 Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Non-Attainment New Source Re-
view (NSR): Equipment Replacement Provision of the Routine Maintenance, Repair and 
Replacement Exclusion, 68 Fed. Reg. 61,248, 61,253 (Oct. 27, 2003) (codified at 40 C.F.R. 
§§ 5l.165-.166, 52.21) (indicating that advancing technology may force operators to re-
place old equipment with more modern equipment when the old equipment wears out). 
5! See generally JERRY MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE 
'IU IMPROVE PUBLIC LAw (1997). 
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predicting future trends stemming from private decision~ about inno-
vation. 
We can now generally outline the idea of the economic dynamics 
of environmental law. An economic dynamic exists that tends to dimin-
ish environmental quality over time. Any person can realize a profit by 
taking a natural resource and converting it into a product for sale to 
human beings. Hence, the free market provides a continuous incentive 
to find and deploy environmentally degrading innovations in order to 
meet human material needs and desires. Indeed, the market provides 
an incentive for producers to encourage expanding material desires 
over time, through advertising. Population increases, a natural product 
of fundamental biological impulses, and human desires to have more 
stuff accelerate this dynamic tendency to increase resource use over 
time. 
As the laws of thermodynamics explain, increased resource use 
over time diminishes the stock of useful resources that can sustain 
wealth. The second law of thermodynamics teaches that production 
converts low-entropy resources into high-entropy waste, which has less 
economic potential,53 Thus, over time, use of nonrenewable resources 
or harvesting of renewable resources at rates exceeding their poten-
tial for renewal should lead to reductions in wealth. 
While the free market offers substantial incentives to innovate in 
order to create more goods, it offers no strong, continuous incentive 
to innovate for the sake of improving environmental quality. The free 
market may encourage bigger cars that carry more people on rougher 
terrain, but it does little to encourage the most environmentally 
friendly automobile possible. The free market regularly encourages 
entrepreneurs to take big risks in order to try and earn money satisfY-
ing our material desires, but offers no incentive for such risk-taking 
for the sake of the environment. 
The continuous possibility of profit from environmental degrada-
tion tends to limit countervailing government efforts toward preserva-
tion. People who make profits from environmentally-degrading activi-
ties acquire the means to hire lawyers and lobbyists to limit government 
efforts to protect the environment. And all of us have an incentive to 
favor reduced taxation, which limits the administrative capacity of gov-
ernment. Over time, these efforts have a rather profound effect. 
53 DALY, supra note 41, at 65, 194-95. See generally NICHOLAS GEORGESCu-ROEGEN, THE 
ENTROPY LAW AND THE ECONOMIC PROCESS (1971). 
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Notice that this description focuses upon the macroeconomic 
picture, the large shape of society over time. This description con-
cerns itself not just with the effects this dynamic may have on any 
given government or private decision. It concerns itself with how 
many decisions implementing change might occur over time. Because 
the free market is more decentralized than the government, many 
more potentially environmentally degrading private decisions will be 
made than countervailing government decisions. If the number of 
private innovations protecting the environment falls far behind the 
number of private decisions harming the environment, then long-
term environmental degradation will prove very difficult to avoid. 
This dynamic, once properly understood, should reshape our 
thinking about environmental law. The question of how to make each 
governmental regulation efficient becomes less important than that of 
how to address this larger dynamic. Since the number of regulatory 
decisions per unit of time will tend to remain small relative to the 
number of private decisions that do not internalize environmental 
costs, the dynamic suggests that a set of perfectly efficient regulatory 
decisions will not lead to a perfectly or even largely efficient economy. 
This theory should influence both those who believe that efficiency is 
the proper goal of environmental protection and those who do not. 
Either way, the underlying dynamic is important. 
The theory of economic dynamics not only leads to a different de-
scription of the macroeconomics of environmental law, and thereby to 
different questions about how to achieve the normative goals of envi-
ronmentallaw, it also provides tools for critiquing legal rules and their 
effects upon innovation and change. This micro-level analysis calls into 
question the conventional wisdom regarding regulatory design. 
Economic dynamic analysis of environmental law has four uses. 
First, it provides a basis for critiquing the efficiency-based prescriptions 
for regulatory reform. Second, it should change our analysis of envi-
ronmentallaw and policy, reshaping our perception of what constitutes' 
its most importan t characteristics. Third, it should change the ques-
tions we focus upon in thinking about reform of environmental law, 
inviting us to ask how to alter the dynamics that determine long-term 
performance. Fourth, it improves the precision of analysis leading to 
new reform recommendations. This article will employ the theory to 
provide a critique of several efficiency-based recommendations for en-
vironmentallaw and then show how the theory raises new questions 
about environmental policy and law. 
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III. ECONOMIC DYNAMIC CRITIQUE OF EFFICIENCy-BASED POLICIES 
Economic dynamic analysis emphasizes change over time, sys-
tematic change, and precise analysis of how incentives affect individu-
als and institutions.54 This distinguishes it from efficiency-based analy-
sis, which is static, focused on an individual transaction, frequently 
employs vague and incomplete analysis of an incentive's impacts, and 
often ignores institutional considerations. 55 This Part briefly examines 
some of the questions it raises about priority-setting, cost-benefit 
analysis, and emissions trading. 
A. Efficiency-Based Priority-Setting 
The efficiency-based approach toward priority-setting suffers from 
institutional vagueness. 56 The notion that uneven dollars per lives saved 
indicates a systemic problem with priority-setting sounds plausible on 
the surface, but appears quite misguided if one considers institutional 
context.57 
Advocates relying on the regulatory reform tables act as if all re-
sources in the world are fungible. 58 Anytime a government agency 
spends "too much" on one environmental problem, argue some of 
these reformers, it kills people by foregoing an opportunity to spend 
that money on a cheaper life-saving intervention.59 But most govern-
ment regulation does not spend government money to remedy envi-
ronmental problems; rather, it establishes rules that effectively require 
polluters to spend money cleaning up the messes they have created.5O 
This very simple fact has enormous consequences. It means that the 
private money saved from foregoing an expensive regulation will usu-
ally not be spent on other health and safety priorities-unless the gov-
ernment is willing to tax the polluting industry and use the money thus 
raised for some better life-saving purpose.61 
A responsible debate about improving priority-setting would dis-
tinguish debates about how to expend government monies from de-
bates about the stringency of government regulation, which does not 
54 See DRIESEN, supra note I, at 6-12. 
55 See id. at 15-31. 
56 See Driesen, supra note 6, at 10,012-13, 10,017. 
57Id. at 10,013, 10,017-18. 
58 See id. at 10,017 (citing BREYER, supra note 2, at 12-18). 
59 See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 18, at 53-55 (describing the theory of sta-
tistical murder regulatory reformers employ). 
60 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411, 7412 (2000). 
61 See Driesen, supra note 6, at 10,016. 
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spend public money.62 We can legitimately require chemical plants to 
clean up their pollution.63 It is not so clear that institutional and legal 
restraints allow us to require chemical plants to fund unrelated life-
saving interests, like improved automobile safety or childhood vaccina-
tions that regulatory reformers sometimes suggest receive too little at-
tention.64 
Economic dynamic theory's concern with the pace of government 
regulation calls attention to another important element in the priority-
setting debate.65 While better priority-setting is always desirable, exer-
cises in priority-setting must be limited. Otherwise, we will have endless 
debates about priority-setting in lieu of any significant accomplish-
ments.66 Government has a pronounced tendency to debate priorities 
in lieu of action, since debates offer opportunities for involvement and 
analysis, whereas action generates political controversy that can harm 
government officials.67 These sorts of institutional considerations have 
figured prominently in the design of laws governing priority-setting at 
administrative agencies, as they should.68 Thus, for example, Congress 
has exempted administrative decisions about whom to regulate first 
from judicial review under several statutory provisions, set strict dead-
lines, and employed sensible, but fairly open-ended, criteria for these 
crucial priority-setting decisions.69 This represen ts a sound response to 
the economic dynamic problems of regulation. 
B. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Proponents of allocative efficiency tend to advocate increased 
reliance upon cost-benefit analysis as the means of choosing goals for 
specific environmental regulations.7o These proposals have met with 
some skepticism regarding both the theory and practice of measuring 
62 See generally id. at 10,010-13. 
63 Seeid. at 10,017. 
64 See id. at 10,015-16 (citing BREYER, supra note 2, at 19, 67). 
66 DRIESEN, supra note 1, at 12 (noting the ·slow and uncertain" pace of government 
decision making ) . 
66 Driesen, supra note 6, at 10,019. 
67 See generally DRIES EN, supra note 1, at 12. 
68 See Driesen, supra note 6, at 10,006 (discussing exemptions of ordering decisions 
from litigation and precautionary approach to agency agenda setting, both of which avoid 
paralysis in priority setting preceding regulation). 
69 Id. 
70 DRIESEN, supra note 1, at 17 (explaining that CBA helps to determine regulations' 
goals). 
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the environmental benefits of regulations.71 Economic dynamic the-
ory raises some questions about estimates of costs as well, and about 
the lack of correspondence between optimal regulation and optimal 
pollution levels. 
1. Compliance Costs 
A regulated party will incur compliance costs after an agency 
promulgates a regulation, usually several years later. Studies comparing 
. regulatory cost estimates with actual compliance costs show that regula-
tors almost always overestimate costs.72 This matters a lot, because the 
regulator pursuing optimal regulatory levels would purchase more 
emission reductions if the costs were lower. 
Economic dynamics help explain why this occurs so regularly. 
Even if an agency perfectly estimated the control cost a regulation 
would generate prior to promulgation, the very act of enacting the 
regulation lowers the cost. The pre-promulgation cost estimates rep-
resent guesses based on a less-robust market than will exist after an 
agency promulgates a regulation. Once an agency enacts a rule, regu-
lated companies will expect their managers to find the cheapest pos-
sible way of complying in a competitive market. If they use the tech-
nologies contemplated at the time of promulgation, they will seek the 
lowest possible prices through competitive bidding. Furthermore, if 
they can find a cheaper method of meeting the regulatory target, they 
will use it. Hence, the equilibrium a cost-benefit criterion tries so hard 
to capture disappears upon promulgation of a regulation, because of 
the economic dynamic involved. 
The regulatory process creates some economic dynamics that 
hinder the development of accurate information about costs, even if 
they were predictable. Regulators rely heavily upon regulated industry 
for estimates of control costs.73 Regulated industry has an incentive to 
exaggerate control costs in order to persuade the regulator to adopt 
less stringent regulation. CBA would tend to exacerbate this problem 
by giving erroneous cost estimates greater weight in decisionmaking. 
71 See id. at 21 (discussing the difficulty of quantifying environmental risks for CBA). 
72 THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATIJRY 
ANALYSIS IN TIlE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 131 (1996); Winston Harrington, et aI., On the 
Accuratry of Rep;ulatory Cost Estimates, 19 J. POL'y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 297 (2000); Thomas O. 
McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety, and Environmental Rep;ula-
tion, 80 TEx. L. REv. 1997 (2002). 
73 McGARITY, supra note 72, at 131-32. 
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2. Optimal Regulation as the Enemy of Optimal Pollution Levels 
One cost-benefit criterion, that the cost of each regulation 
should equal its benefits, leads to sub-optimal societal pollution levels. 
Environmental law typically addresses an individual pollution prob-
lem, such as urban smog, through a series of regulations demanding 
reductions from multiple pollution sources, because most negative 
environmental and health effects come from the combined impact of 
numerous pollution sources. An allocatively "efficient" regulatory sys-
tem will not produce "optimal pollution" if it fails to address all pollu-
tion sources. The combination of a cost-benefit balanced group of 
regulated pollution sources and a group of sources emitting pollution 
that have no control costs will produce less than the optimal amount 
of pollution.74 Today's statutes still leave a number of significant pol-
lution sources, such as non-point water pollution sources, mostly un-
regulated. So this disjunction between optimal regulation and optimal 
societal pollution levels is a serious problem, even for those commit-
ted to efficiency goals. 
Economic dynamic analysis-in other words, an analysis that looks 
at issues affecting the total number of regulatory decisions over time, 
not just the efficiency of each decision-shows that CBA will increase 
the number of unregulated pollution sources, thus exacerbating the 
problem. CBA has generated paralyzing transaction costs. CBA requires 
an extremely comprehensive and difficult analytical effort that takes 
enormous resources and saps agencies' abilities to comprehensively 
address environmental problems, which stem from numerous sources, 
including cumulatively significant, but small and difficult to regulate, 
sources. Pollution continues unabated during the compilation of a 
CBA, judicial review of CBA, and remand of unsatisfactory analysis. 75 
Remands may be very common, because non-arbitrary CBA is so 
difficult.76 Even if the outcome of the analysis is a perfectly efficient de-
cision, the continuation of pollution from unregulated sources that 
agencies never reach because of the analytic effort may well defeat ef-
forts to have the "optimum" amount of pollution. 
74 Barbara White, Coase and the Courts, 72 IOWA L. REv. 577 (1987). 
75 DRIESEN, supra note 1, at 27. 
76Id. 
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B. Emissions Trading 
Efficiency-minded economists have tended to recommend emis-
sions trading or taxes as instruments of environmental protection.77 
Since emissions trading has received the most emphasis in practice, 
this Part will focus on how an economic dynamic perspective changes 
analysis of emissions trading. 
From an economic dynamic perspective the question of which 
instrument provides the lowest short-term costs is not particularly im-
portant. Rather, the question becomes which instrument provides the 
most incentive for innovation that can increase our capabilities to ad-
dress environmental threats over time.78 
The traditional approach tends to assume an identity between en-
couraging efficiency and encouraging worthwhile innovation through 
the concept of dynamic efficiency.79 But the suggestion that short-term 
cost effectiveness and desirable innovation coincide ignores both sali-
ent economic theory-namely the induced innovation hypothesis-
and precise analysis of relevant incentives.so 
The induced innovation hypothesis suggests that innovation oc-
curs when the cost of conventional approaches rises, and conversely 
that little innovation will occur when the cost of conventional ap-
proaches fall. 81 Emissions trading reduces the cost of employing con-
ventional approaches, which would suggest that it would lessen incen-
tives to innovate.82 
One can see this most easily in the case of high-cost innovation. 
Emissions trading will not cause coal-fired power plants to shut down 
in favor of renewable energy sources or car manufacturers to intro-
duce hydrogen-based fuel cells. Emissions trading facilitates selection 
of the cheapest short-term response to regulatory demand, not the 
most environmentally advantageous and adaptively efficient alterna-
tives for the long term.53 This matters, because investment in high-
77 See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 30. 
78 See DRIESEN, supra note 1, at 75. 
79Id. at 65. 
80 David M. Driesen, Does Emissions Trading Encourage Innovation 1, [2003] 33 Envtl. L. 
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,094,10,097-98 (Jan., 2003). 
81 See id.; Richard G. Newell et a!., The Induced Innovation Hypothesis and Energy-Saving 
Technological Change, 114 QJ. ECON. 941 (1999). 
82 See Driesen, supra note 80, at 10,097-98. 
8!1 See David M. Driesen, Free Lunch or Cheap Fix 1: The Emissions Trading Idea and the Cli-
mate Change Convention, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 1,44 (1998) (discussing this point's 
implications for environmental benefit trading under the climate change regime). 
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cost options can lower costs over time.54 High costs often prove tem-
porary under conditions of change.55 
Traditional regulation mandates emission reductions from 
specific pollution sources.86 Does the spatial flexibility emissions trad-
ing offers provide superior incentives for innovation in general? 
The trading mechanism creates an economic incentive for pol-
luters facing high marginal control costs to increase emissions above 
the otherwise applicable limit, at least to the extent that the high-cost 
polluters plan to purchase relatively cheap credits from other 
sources.S7 It also creates an incentive for polluters facing low marginal 
control costs to decrease emissions, at least to the extent the polluter 
plans to sell credits to sources with high costs.88 If the market func-
tions smoothly, then trading occurs, the incentives cancel each other 
out, and the net economic incentive generally mirrors that of a com-
parable traditional regulation.89 
Because a well-designed trading program may induce pollution 
sources with low marginal control costs to go beyond regulatory limits 
to a greater degree than they would under a traditional regulation, 
commentators focusing only on the low-cost sources have argued that 
emissions trading creates greater incentives for technological innova-
tion than traditional regulation.90 As some economists have realized, 
this argument ignores the incentive for high-cost sources to avoid pol-
lution reduction activities.91 Trading reduces the incentive for high-
cost sources to apply new technology. 
In theory, emissions trading probably weakens net incentives for 
innovation.92 
If a regulation allows facilities to use trading to meet stan-
dards, the low-cost facilities tend to provide more of the total 
reductions than they would provide under a comparable tra-
84 See DRIESEN, supra note I, at 83-85. 
8!5 Driesen, supra note 80, at 10,097-98. 
86 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2000) (Clean Air Act provisions regulating performance 
standards for new sources); 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (Clean Water Act provisions regulating per-
formance standards for new sources). 
87 Hahn & Stavins, supra note 30, at 13. 
88 Id. 
89 See DRIESEN, supra note I, at 64. 
90 See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 30, at 13. 
91 DAVID WALLACE, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: STRATEGIES 
IN EUROPE, TIlE U.S. AND JAPAN 20 (1995); David A Malueg, Emissions Credit Trading and the 
Incentive to Adopt New Pollution Abatement Technology, 16 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 52 (1987). 
92 Driesen, supra note 80, at 10,097-98. 
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ditional regulation. Conversely, the high-cost facilities will 
provide less of the total required reductions than they would 
have under a comparable traditional regulation. The low-cost 
facilities probably have a greater ability to provide reductions 
without substantial innovation than high-cost facilities. A high-
cost facility may need to innovate to escape the high costs of 
routine compliance; the low-cost facility does not have this 
same motivation. Hence, emissions trading, by shifting reduc-
tions from high-cost to low-cost facilities, may lessen the in-
centives for innovation.93 
IV. TOWARD ECONOMIC DYNAMIC REFORM 
Economic dynamic analysis focuses upon the need for environ-
mentally friendly innovation to occur quite regularly to keep up with 
growing environmental problems associated with rising population and 
consumption.94 It uses the free market as a model, not of perfect 
efficiency-which it does not possess-but of how to encourage innova-
tion-which the free market does well when competition is robust. The 
problem, of course, is that the free market does not encourage innova-
tion protecting the environment very well, except in those cases where 
environmental protection happily coincides with reduced cost, and not 
always then.95 When environmental innovation would produce fabu-
lously valuable environmental improvements, even nominal costs can 
discourage realization of these improvements.96 Because of this, gov-
ernment must produce a regulatory, stimulus-driving innovation that 
works something like consumer demand does in free markets. But eco-
nomic dynamic analysis reveals that impediments exist to government 
playing this role well.97 Recognition of the nature of these impedimen ts 
creates a new set of questions for environmental policy making and law 
to focus upon. 
A. Privatization 
Free markets tend to produce demand for innovation, because 
consumers offer decentralized and flexible sources of demand and op-
93 Driesen, supra note 32, at 335. 
94 See DRIESEN, supra note 1, at 9-10. 
95 See id. at 98. 
96 See id. 
97 See id. at 112-19. 
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portunity. Government, by contrast, tends toward slow and plodding 
environmental protection enacted through painstaking rulemaking 
proceedings.98 This naturally invites the question of whether privatiza-
tion can allow government to escape its tendency to fall behind the 
curve of private decisions increasing pollution.99 
This suggestion will strike those enamored of government solu-
tions as a bad idea. But we already have some environmentally 
beneficial forms of privatization in environmental law. IOO The citizen 
suit has privatized some enforcement of environmental law and thereby 
increased the vigor of enforcement.IOI Likewise, "right-to-know" re-
quirements have encouraged voluntary private pollution reduction. I02 
We can design more dynamic economic incentives that encourage 
competition to reduce pollution, much as the free market creates com-
petition to provide better amenities. This requires creation of mecha-
nisms that circumvent the need for repeated government decisions and 
allow private actions, rather than government decisions, to stimulate 
reductions in pollution. 
The law can apply to polluters either positive economic incen-
tives, such as revenue increases or cost decreases, or negative eco-
nomic incentives, such as revenue decreases or cost increases. This 
reveals a possibility that has received too little attention. Negative eco-
nomic incentives can fund positive economic incentives. 
Governments have already employed this strategy. New Zealand 
addressed the depletion of its fisheries by imposing fees on fishing, a 
negative economic incentive, and using revenue from these fees to 
pay some fishermen to retire, a positive economic incentive.I°3 This 
may reduce pressure on the fish if fees are high enough. The Califor-
nia legislature has considered a program, Drive +, that imposes a fee 
upon consumers purchasing an energy-inefficient or high-pollution 
vehicle.104 The proceeds fund a rebate on the purchase of an energy-
98 Id. 
99 See id. at 139-61 (considering this question at greater length). 
100 DRIESEN, supra note I, at 140-41. 
101 See id. at 140-45 (discussing citizen suit's value as a source of vigor and suggesting 
ways to enhance that value). 
102 See id. at 146; Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI 
and Performance Benchmarking, Precursors to a Paradigm, 89 GEO. LJ. 257, 297 (2001). 
10! T.H. Tietenberg, Using Economic Incentives to Maintain Our Environment, 33 CHAL-
LENGE 42 (1990). 
104 Nathanael Greene & Vanessa Ward, Getting the Sticker Price Right: Incentives for Cleaner, 
More Efficient Vehicles, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 91, 94-95 (1994). 
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efficient vehicle or low-polluting vehicle.105 Similarly, New Hampshire 
officials have proposed an "Industry Average Performance System" 
that redistributes pollution taxes to the polluting industry in ways that 
favor lower emissions. 
One can build on this principle of having negative economic in-
centives fund positive economic incentives to craft laws that mimic the 
free market's dynamic competitive character far better than taxes or 
subsidies. In a competitive free market, a firm that innovates to reduce 
its cost or increase its revenues not only increases its profits, it often 
reduces its competitors' profits. Hence, firms in a very competitive 
market face strong incentives to innovate and improve. Failing to inno-
vate and improve can threaten their survival. Implementing innova-
tions and improvements can help firms prosper in a competitive mar-
ket. One might seek to design environmental law to create a similar 
dynamic. 
One could craft, for example, an "environmental competition 
law" requiring polluters with relatively high pollution levels to pay any 
costs that competitors incur in realizing lower pollution levels plus a 
substantial premium, thereby creating a significant incentive to be 
among the first to eliminate or drastically reduce targeted pollut-
ants.106 Such a law would simply authorize any polluter to collect costs 
plus a premium from any competing firm with higher pollution levels. 
Thus, for example, a power plant that switched fuels to achieve a 
lower emissions rate per kilowatt-hour than its competitors might col-
lect the cost of the fuel switching from its coal-burning competitor, 
plus a premium. 
An environmental competition law directly attacks a fundamental 
problem with existing free market incentives: the polluting firm must 
absorb any cleanup costs. Because the firm does not experience all of 
the costs of pollution itself-most are externalized and felt by the 
general public-it rarely pays to clean up. If firms could systematically 
externalize the costs of cleanup without substantial administrative in-
tervention, just as they externalize the cost of pollution, then even a 
fairly modest premium might create adequate incentives to control 
pollution. 
This solves another problem as well. The free market system pro-
vides no systematic incentive for environmentally superior perform-
105 [d. 
106 See DRIESEN, supra note 1, at 153-61 (discussing this idea in some detail). 
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ance. The environmental competition statute regularly rewards supe-
riot environmental performance. 
An environmental competition statute would create a private en-
vironmental law, with a few public decisions setting up the law, but 
substantial enforcement by low-polluting businesses against competi-
tors. The law would create a private right of action that allows a busi-
ness that realizes environmental improvements through investment in 
pollution-reducing or low-pollution processes, control devices, prod-
ucts, or services to secure reimbursement for expenses, plus some 
premium from more polluting competitors. Hence, the scheme would 
create economic incentives for some companies to become enforcers 
of the law, rather than creating incentives for most companies to resist 
enforcement. This would effectively privatize enforcement, making it 
a private activity, rather than a government activity with some public-
spirited private support, as in the citizen suit mechanism. 
Such a proposal overcomes the fundamen tal problem with tradi-
tional regulation, emissions trading, and pollution taxes. These 
mechanisms rely on government decisions as the driver for pollution 
reductions. An environmental competition law makes private initiative, 
motivated by the prospect of gain and the fear of loss, the driver of en-
vironmental improvement, thus replicating free market dynamics. The 
magnitude of the incentive may depend upon the extent of industry 
fears about competitors' achievements, rather than only the limited 
cost government imposes through regulation or pollution taxes. 
Whether or not one accepts the value of this particular idea, it 
should demonstrate the value of taking on the plodding nature of 
government as a problem to be overcome by reliance on the model 
provided by the economic dynamics of the free market. Once we 
move beyond policy prescriptions rooted in efficiency-based analysis, 
new possibilities emerge. 
B. More Fair and Effective Regulation 
Combining analysis of the practical economic dynamic resulting 
from opportunities to profit systematically from the conversion of natu-
ral resources to products for consumption, with the insights of public 
choice theory, explains some important features of the regulatory sys-
tem that receive insufficient attention. Each of us finances the thwart-
ing of environmental regulation through our gas and utility payments. 
These payments pay for an army of environmental lawyers, scientists, 
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and economists that work hard to prevent enactment and effective en-
forcement of environmental regulation.lo7 This makes environmental 
regulation less adaptively efficient than it might be, produces inordi-
nate delay, and at times, the gutting of environ men tal laws. 108 
Yet, efficiency-based analysis pays little attention to this problem. 
Once one focuses on this as a problem, many potential solutions sug-
gest themselves.109 Public participation currently rests on the principle 
of open participation; all can participate as much as they want. 110 This 
approach advantages those with the most capacity to participate-
namely, those who can hire professionals in great numbers to 
represent them, like existing dirty industries-not the public seeking 
relief from environmental problems or environmental entrepreneurs 
hoping to create new markets for environmental innovations.lll 
We should at least think about a system of equal participation. ll2 
In such a system, those who wish to hire professionals to represen t 
their interests would have to hire professionals for their opposition. A 
less-radical reform might involve devoting more taxpayer money to 
technical assistance to communities hoping to benefit from environ-
mental regulations and companies with promising new technologies 
to participate more actively. 
Again, my point is not to strongly advocate any particular solu-
tion to existing inequities in regulatory process, but rather to suggest 
that economic dynamic analysis identifies the existence of these ineq-
uities as problems to be solved. And this problem has received in-
sufficient attention, because of a myopic focus upon the static 
efficiency of each regulation viewed as a transaction. 
C. Improved Regulatory Design to Stimulate Change 
The issue of regulatory design has received amazingly little atten-
tion. Part of this failure to think about this important issue comes 
from the simplistic preoccupation with the project of bashing "com-
mand and control" regulation and promoting emissions trading. But 
design may matter as much or more to the economic dynamics of 
regulation than the choice between traditional regulation and emis-
107 DRIESEN, supra note 1, at 114. 
lOB See generally id. at 115-16 (describing some of the forces creating this situation). 
109 See id. at 163-81 (reviewing a variety of possible proposals to make environmental 
regulation more fair and effective). 
110 See id. at 167. 
\11 See id. at 169-70. 
112 See id. at 170-76 (discussing a number of ways of equalizing participation). 
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sions trading. This should not be surprising. Emissions trading com-
bines a traditional regulation limiting emissions with an authorization 
to trade. While the trading may enhance regulation's cost savings, the 
design of the regulatory limits that motivate the trading will influence 
a trading program, just as design influences a program that does not 
authorize trading.ll!l 
Many regulations, including both traditional regulation and state 
emissions trading programs, limit emission rates.1l4 Emission rates 
limit the amount of pollution per unit of activity. For example, many 
regulations limiting air pollution coming from applications of paints, 
coatings, and solvents limit the pounds of emissions per gallon of sub-
stance used. EPA has traditionally regulated electric utilities through 
limits on the pounds of pollution per million British Thermal Units 
(BTUs), which measure energy use}15 
The federal acid rain program and the federal regulations imple-
menting the phase-out of ozone-depleting substances, however, limit 
the total mass of permitted pollution.1l6 In other words, the ozone-
depletion regulations limit the tons of such substances produced each 
year. The acid rain program limits tons of sulfur dioxide emitted per 
year. 
This distinction between mass-based and rate-based limits matters 
a lot to the effectiveness of regulation and its economic dynamic. A 
rate-based regulation does not limit the mass of pollution that a pollu-
tion source may discharge. If a company's activity level increases, so 
will its pollution. On the other hand, a mass-based regulation limits 
the actual quantity of pollution allowed. If a company wishes to in-
crease its production, it must reduce its emissions rate so as to meet 
the mass-based requirement. 117 
This means that mass-based limits provide a built-in economic 
dynamic that rate-based limits lack. A company wishing to produce 
more of a product to meet rising demand must find ways to obtain 
m DRIES EN, supra note 1, at 193. 
114 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 90-2447, 1991 WI.. 
157261 (4th Cir. Aug. 19, 1991); United States v. Allsteel, No. 87 C 4638, 1989 WI.. 103405 
(N.D. HI. Aug. 30, 1989) (unpublished disposition); United States v. Alcan Foil Products, 
694 F. Supp. 1280, 1281 (W.D. Ky. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 889 F.2d 1513 (6th Cir. 
1989). 
115 Byron Swift, Command Without Control: Why Cap-and-Trade Should Replace Rate Stan-
dardsforRegionalPollutants, [2001] 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,330,10,331 (Mar., 
2001). 
116 DRIESEN, supra note 1, at 194-95. 
117 Id. at 195. 
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high cost. Stringent regulation has brought about the elimination of 
lead from gasoline, the sale of substitutes for ozone depleting sub-
stances, the removal of some regulated toxic chemicals from some 
occupational settings, and other rather significant changes. By limit-
ing opportunities to use standard technologies, stringent regulation 
encourages innovation. Analysts regularly confuse opportunities for a 
wide range of technological responses-such as those provided by the 
absence of an environmental regulation-with a substantial incentive 
to provide environmental innovation.127 
CONCLUSION 
In general, economic dynamic analysis raises the issue of how to 
improve the economic dynamics of environmental law. Consideration 
of this issue leads to a sharply different set of questions than those 
currently dominating the field. These include the question of whether 
privatization is appropriate, of how to make administrative procedure 
more fair and effective, and of how to improve regulatory design. Fo-
cusing the policy debate upon these questions would constitute a 
significant and worthwhile change. 
127 [d. 
